By Paul Salmon FCILT, FSCM
Introduction: The Ammunition Paradox
In Defence supply chains, some commodities follow predictable rhythms. Engines fail after a certain number of hours, tyres wear down after so many miles, medical consumables expire within known shelf lives. Forecasting spares for these categories, while never easy, can be modelled using decades of usage data and reliability statistics.
Ammunition is different.
Unlike spare parts, demand for ammunition is not driven by failure rates, but by operational use. A single day of high-intensity combat can consume more munitions than months of training. Consumption rates vary wildly between peacekeeping missions, deterrence postures, and major wars. Ammunition also has strict shelf-life constraints, long production lead times, and a geopolitical supply base that can be fragile in crises.
For these reasons, ammunition forecasting is among the most complex and mission-critical challenges in Defence logistics. Get it wrong, and the consequences are stark: either wasted billions in surplus stockpiles, or catastrophic shortages in combat.
What Ammunition Forecasting Is – and Isn’t
At its core, ammunition forecasting is the process of predicting:
How much ammunition will be required What types and calibres will be needed When and where the demand will occur
The goal is deceptively simple: ensure ammunition is available in the right place at the right time to sustain training and operations, without creating unmanageable stockpiles that expire unused or cost billions to maintain.
Unlike spares forecasting, however, ammunition demand is not governed by mechanical wear. It is dictated by human intent and operational tempo. A commander’s choice of tactics, the intensity of enemy action, and the rules of engagement can all swing demand unpredictably.
Key Drivers of Ammunition Demand
Training Requirements Defence forces allocate set quantities of ammunition to ensure personnel maintain weapon proficiency. For example, a soldier may fire 90 rounds annually to qualify on a rifle, or an artillery crew may have live-fire exercises scheduled. These training allocations form the baseline of forecasts. Operational Scenarios Ammunition usage varies dramatically by mission. A peacekeeping operation may consume minimal live rounds. A high-intensity conflict may burn through thousands of shells daily. Forecasting must account for the full spectrum of possibilities. Rules of Engagement (ROE) Political and ethical constraints can alter demand. Precision-guided munitions may be mandated in urban combat to reduce collateral damage, driving consumption of expensive, scarce weapons over cheaper alternatives. Platform Introductions New weapons systems create new demands. The introduction of drones, next-generation artillery, and hypersonic missiles brings unfamiliar calibres and high-cost items into forecasts. Contingency and Surge Factors Wars rarely unfold according to plan. Forecasts must allow for unexpected spikes, prolonged campaigns, or attritional combat. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how quickly “peacetime assumptions” can be invalidated.
The Challenges of Ammunition Forecasting
1. Unpredictability of Use
Unlike spare parts, there is no mean time between failure for bullets or missiles. Usage can spike unpredictably, driven by battle intensity, weather, terrain, or tactical choices.
2. Diversity of Inventory
Defence forces manage thousands of types of ammunition, from small arms rounds to artillery shells, naval missiles, and precision-guided air-launched munitions. Forecasting each with accuracy is a monumental task.
3. Shelf-Life and Safety
Munitions degrade. Propellants, explosives, and fuzes all have finite lives, requiring strict monitoring and disposal when expired. Over-forecasting is not simply wasteful — it creates long-term liability and disposal costs.
4. Long Production Lead Times
Unlike simple spares, modern ammunition often has lead times of months or years. A Javelin missile or Storm Shadow cannot be produced overnight. Forecast errors lock in capability gaps long into the future.
5. Supply Chain Fragility
The global ammunition supply base is narrow. Specialist chemicals, propellants, and electronic components often come from single suppliers. During crises, national governments prioritise domestic demand, leaving Defence buyers exposed.
6. Secrecy and Classification
Operational plans, which drive ammunition demand, are often highly classified. This makes data sharing and collaborative forecasting harder than in other supply categories.
How Ammunition Forecasting Is Done
Despite these challenges, Defence organisations use a blend of methods to forecast demand:
Activity-Based Forecasting (Bottom-Up) Calculates ammunition needs based on planned activities. For example: 10,000 soldiers × 90 rounds per annual qualification = 900,000 rounds forecast. 12 artillery batteries × 20 shells per exercise = 240 shells forecast. This method works well for training and routine readiness. Historical Usage (Top-Down) Uses data from past conflicts or training to estimate future requirements. For example: analysing artillery usage in Gulf War I to inform NATO stockpile policy. The limitation is that no two wars are identical. Scenario and Simulation Models Wargaming, operational simulations, and campaign modelling are increasingly used to estimate ammunition expenditure under different conflict scenarios. For instance, NATO simulations of a 30-day peer conflict to determine stockpile sufficiency. Hybrid Approaches In practice, Defence combines all three: activity-based forecasts for training, historical benchmarks for baseline consumption, and scenario models for contingency planning.
Historical Case Studies
The Falklands War (1982)
The Falklands highlighted the difficulty of predicting ammunition needs in remote, austere theatres. Naval gunfire support and air-delivered munitions were consumed at higher-than-expected rates, while logistical constraints limited resupply options. Forecasts based on peacetime training bore little resemblance to wartime expenditure.
NATO and the Cold War
During the Cold War, NATO stockpiled vast quantities of ammunition in Europe, expecting a short but intense conventional war with the Warsaw Pact. Ammunition forecasts were based on attritional scenarios projecting enormous daily usage. While the war never came, the stockpiles underpinned deterrence. The eventual challenge was disposal — billions spent destroying obsolete munitions.
Ukraine (2022–)
Ukraine has shattered many assumptions about ammunition demand. Daily artillery expenditure by both sides has exceeded Western forecasts, creating global shortages. NATO countries discovered their stockpiles were insufficient for prolonged high-intensity war, and production capacity had atrophied. Ammunition forecasting failures became matters of national strategy, forcing rapid industrial ramp-up and multinational coordination.
The Cost of Getting It Wrong
Ammunition forecasting errors have profound consequences:
Over-Forecasting: Creates bloated stockpiles, high storage and maintenance costs, and expensive disposal obligations when munitions expire. Under-Forecasting: Risks catastrophic shortages in war, undermining operational credibility, alliance commitments, and deterrence. Distorted Industry Signals: Inaccurate forecasts mislead manufacturers, causing either idle capacity or bottlenecks when surges occur.
In essence, poor ammunition forecasting risks wasting billions in peace or costing lives in war.
Towards More Resilient Ammunition Forecasting
1. Integrating Predictive Analytics
Defence can use AI and machine learning to ingest broader datasets — from training records to intelligence assessments — to refine forecasts dynamically. Predictive models can help identify emerging shortfalls sooner.
2. Building Flexible Industrial Capacity
Forecasts will never be perfect. The answer is to build more agile manufacturing capacity that can surge production when needed. This requires long-term partnerships with industry and incentives to maintain “warm” production lines.
3. Pooled Stockpiles and Alliances
Just as NATO has discussed pooled fuel reserves, ammunition could be shared across allies under transparent rules. Collective forecasts reduce duplication and spread risk.
4. Rotation Through Civilian Systems
Where feasible (e.g., small arms ammunition), Defence can rotate stocks through civilian markets, reducing expiry-driven waste and refreshing inventories.
5. Professionalising Forecasting Skills
Forecasting ammunition requires unique expertise — part logistician, part strategist, part data analyst. Building professional pathways and CPD for ammunition planners strengthens both confidence and accuracy.
6. Red Teaming Forecasts
Subjecting forecasts to challenge from independent “red teams” can expose biases and flawed assumptions. This reduces the risk of optimism or complacency distorting stockpile decisions.
Conclusion: Ammunition as the Ultimate Test of Forecasting
Ammunition forecasting sits at the intersection of logistics, strategy, and uncertainty. Unlike spare parts, demand cannot be derived from engineering data. Unlike medical spares, it cannot be predicted from population health profiles. Ammunition demand is driven by human decisions in the fog of war.
History offers sobering lessons: the Falklands showed the gap between peacetime models and combat reality; Cold War NATO proved the deterrent value of massive stockpiles but also the cost of waste; Ukraine revealed that decades of “just enough” peacetime assumptions had left Western stockpiles dangerously thin.
The lesson is clear: ammunition forecasting is not about prediction alone. It is about building readiness for uncertainty. Models must be blended with judgment, stockpiles must be balanced with agility, and industry must be ready to surge.
If spare parts forecasting is a science, ammunition forecasting is an art — one where the price of failure is measured not just in money, but in lives and strategic credibility.
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